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The objective of this field-based research was to assess the impact of natural disasters and 
disaster interventions on protracted intra-state conflicts and to provide insight for designing and 
implementing disaster interventions in conflict situations. The field research was conducted in 
Sri Lanka and Aceh/Indonesia as a comparative analysis. The researchers chose Sri Lanka and 
Aceh/Indonesia because both were severely hit by the tsunami in December 2004 and have been 
marred by intra-State conflicts. The distinct nature and intensity of these conflicts provided a 
platform to observe the implementation of humanitarian assistance and identify the strengths and 
limitations of the tsunami interventions. The researchers interviewed various experts and 
officials involved in humanitarian and conflict resolution activities. The researchers also had the 
opportunity to observe the realities on the ground and to discuss the situation with the tsunami 
and war affected people. 
 
By applying conflict resolution models and principles in humanitarian assistance this research 
established, among others, two major findings. First, the tsunami and the tsunami interventions 
had different impacts on the dynamics of the two conflicts. In Aceh/Indonesia, the major actors, 
GAM and the Government of Indonesia (GOI), successfully negotiated a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) ending almost 30 years of war. Conversely, in Sri Lanka the relations 
between the government and the LTTE deteriorated. The research analyzes these outcomes and 
attempts to explore the underlying causes of this disparity. Second, in both cases, the tsunami 
interventions suffered from one major shortcoming. The humanitarian assistance did not reach 
the thousands of conflict-affected, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who have been living in 
vulnerable conditions for many years. In addition, drawbacks including: lack of effective 
coordination, conflict insensitivity, low levels of participation by the beneficiaries, and 
undermining local capacities were observed by the researchers and identified by interviewees. 
 
The research provided several recommendations including: innovation in fund raising processes 
and assessment of inflexible and inappropriate mandates, judicious conditionality on debt relief 
measures so as to encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and cross-learning between the 
fields of disaster relief, development, and conflict resolution. In addition, it is vital that serious 
steps are taken in regard to the consideration of unique contexts, local values, and domestic 
realities. Also, participatory approaches should be implemented at every level of intervention. 
The researchers suggest that if such and similar steps are taken into account, humanitarian 
assistance will not exacerbate conflict situations and can help to mitigate war and contribute to 
resolutions of conflicts between and among diverse groups. 
 
Due to the nature of a summary many of the intricacies and nuances will unfortunately be 
missing in this document. For a comprehensive discussion please contact Peter Bauman and he 








Summary of Findings 
 
Over a period of two and a half months the research team interviewed over 100 representatives 
of governments, INGOs, UN agencies, bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, the people of Sri 
Lanka and Indonesia/Aceh, members of GAM, the LTTE, local NGOs and CBOs, members of 
civil society, war and tsunami affected IDPs, and of course, the beneficiaries. The following is a 
summary of our findings.  
 
The impact of the tsunami on South-East Asia and the commendable reaction to it created  hope 
and expectation among the international community that something positive would come out of 
the enormous catastrophe. Meeting these hopes and expectations, Indonesia/Aceh appears to be 
engaged in a fragile but successful peace process. After the disaster struck, the two parties not 
only signed the MoU, but also engaged in issues including Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR); political, economic, and social reconstruction, and mending the rather 
strained relationship between the Acehnese and the GOI. Nonetheless, much remains to be done 
to implement the MoU and sustain the atmosphere for, and commitment to, the peace process.  
 
Conversely, the situation in Sri Lanka appears somewhat discouraging. Almost all efforts to 
reduce the level of polarization between the two parties, build confidence, and kick-start the long 
stalled peace process were unsuccessful. The acrimonious propaganda and the actions and 
gestures by both parties indicate the possibility of a relapse into war. In this respect one can 
mention the hawkish President Mahinda Rajapakse coming into power in the recent election. The 
new President, who was the Prime Minister in the last government, was against any forms of 
cooperation with the LTTE including P-TOMS and openly allied with the spoilers such as 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Certain areas in the country particularly in the east are 
militarized, even more than they were before the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). 
  
Given these conflicting scenarios, the logical questions are why and how the tsunami and 
tsunami interventions led to different outcomes. 
 
In Aceh the government was militarily strong and the rebel group had already been weakened 
when the tsunami hit. Also, in the continuous attempt to resolve the conflict between GAM and 
the GOI, a series of quiet talks convened in early 2004. The tsunami further affected GAM as a 
number of its members lost their lives and families. Moreover, the international community used 
its assistance to create a push and pull factor that engaged the parties in the peace process. These 
circumstances made it possible to exploit the humanitarian will created following the tsunami for 
achieving tangible results in settling the conflict peacefully. For instance, a senior member of 
GAM’s negotiating team stated that GAM was pressured by the international community to sign 
several agreements throughout the negotiation process. For example, when negotiating the role 
of the military (TNI) and police in Aceh, the government promised to use the remaining TNI 
soldiers for external threats. The interviewee stated that there were no external threats to Aceh 
and that if anyone attacked Indonesia it would be from the air. Thus, if the government truly 
wanted to defend Indonesia/Aceh they should build a bigger Navy and Air force. According to 
the interviewee, this dispute almost broke the negotiation process but the support, 
encouragement, and pressure of the international community kept GAM from pulling out. The 
interviewee stated that “if GAM signed the agreement then 14,000 TNI and 9,000 police would 
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remain in Aceh, but if GAM did not sign the agreement, it would face the wrath of the 
international community.”  
 
On the other hand, when the tsunami struck, Sri Lanka lacked an active peace process and the 
security situation had been deteriorating since the Karuna split in the LTTE. In addition, the 
GOSL is strong but it faces one of the most sophisticated and formidable rebel groups in the 
world. Moreover, the tsunami did not appear to cause major damage to the military resources of 
the conflicting parties in Sri Lanka. The international community’s role in convincing or 
pressuring the parties to initiate peace talks was also minimal and ineffective. 
 
The following major findings are based on extensive and intensive interviews, observations, and 
literature review concerning the execution of the disaster interventions: 
 
• The tsunami demonstrated that the opportunities created did not necessarily lead to positive 
outcomes in terms of resolving conflict. The sharp contrast between the situations in Sri 
Lanka and Aceh is proof that mere humanitarian spirit is transient unless other subjective and 
objective situations are fulfilled in the realm of conflict resolution. The mere flow of 
tremendous amounts of assistance from the international community did not significantly 
change the contexts of the conflicts or the positions of the conflicting parties at least in Sri 
Lanka. This indicates that in situations where power and identity issues are at the center of a 
conflict, massive destruction, resources, and support will not necessarily bring credible 
incentives or disincentives nor will they bring the necessary political will for peace. As one 
of our interviewees put it, money cannot buy peace.  
 
• In spite of the fact that all agencies and individuals involved in the disaster interventions 
suggested that coordination was important, it is evident that there was a tremendous lack of 
understanding and practical commitment to what and how to coordinate and at what level 
coordination should take place. Most importantly, the focuses of coordination efforts were 
primarily directed to technical aspects - the structure and mechanisms of coordination. While 
some reports suggest that the LTTE, the GOSL, and the INGOs in some cases attempted to 
implement dialogue mechanisms with affected communities, efforts to harness coordination 
as a means to enhance the participation of the beneficiaries and hence improve the quality 
and promptness of assistance to the people were insufficient. Similarly, in Sri Lanka and 
Aceh the disaster interventions implemented by government bodies, the LTTE and, in most 
cases, by NGOs were top-down. The participation of the affected people in the planning, 
design, and implementation of relief and reconstruction processes has been very low. In Sri 
Lanka, both the government and the LTTE made centralized decisions without consulting the 
affected population. As one critic commented, there was a tendency in the humanitarian 
interventions to view the affected people as passive recipients of humanitarian assistance. 
Therefore, the sense of ownership of the process by the beneficiaries has been minimal. The 
situation is not much better in regard to INGOs because they also did not adequately involve 
the people directly or indirectly through their representatives and local entities. Aceh 
experienced similar mishaps to Sri Lanka in regard to coordination. In addition, the level of 
participation was very low as demonstrated by, among other activities, the building of 
inappropriate shelter. The low level of participation might be attributed to the disregard of 
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the international organizations for public interest in the beneficiaries’ role and to the culture 
of fear and intimidation which impacted on the assertiveness of Acehnese society.  
 
• While it was encouraging to observe that the ideas and practice of peace-building has 
attracted local and international NGOs, IGOs, and various members of civil society, it has 
also been alarming that the manner it has been exercised had some negative impact. Much of 
the peace-building activities in Sri Lanka were ad-hoc, project-based, short-term, and non-
integrated. In addition, they lacked clear objectives and few deliberate attempts were made to 
link the various peace-building activities with track-one and perhaps more realistic, track two 
peace efforts. There is a serious concern, therefore, that in a number of cases peace-building 
has been used as rhetoric rather than for serious and purposeful engagement. In Aceh, given 
the fact that the civil society has been repressed for a long time there were no significant, 
organized efforts in peace-building. However, conflict resolution experts have been 
highlighting the need to fill the gap in the Helsinki process by socializing the contents and 
intents of the MOU. 
  
• The tsunami created a situation where INGOs raised more funds than governments and inter-
governmental agencies. This led to situations where INGOs had a substantial amount of 
money without necessarily the experience, the discipline, and/or the capacity to use the funds 
effectively, efficiently, or in a coordinated way. Even experienced NGOs had difficulty 
adapting to the context especially one where they were effectively donors as well as 
implementers. With the multiplicity of partners working within narrow confines in several 
cases it appeared that some INGOs were involved in unnecessary competition to spend 
money without taking into account the appropriateness of their approaches and the services 
and goods they were providing. This financial power combined with a significant degree of 
freedom and a low level of accountability has, in some cases, resulted in arrogance toward 
local NGOs and the inappropriate and ineffective use of resources. 
 
• The issue of mandate has been one of the major bottlenecks in the process of the disaster 
interventions, particularly in terms of addressing serious problems beyond the tsunami even 
when these problems had equal, if not worse, consequences. As a result of organizational 
mandates and the various strings attached to tsunami funds, agencies were obliged to limit 
their operations only to tsunami affected people. In Sri Lanka, the thousands of people who 
have been languishing as IDPs of war for over two decades and others who have been living 
in abject poverty rarely received direct assistance from the post-tsunami relief and 
reconstruction process. In Sri Lanka, it is also important to note that two thirds of the tsunami 
affected areas were in the north and east. Thus, a proportion of the war-affected IDPs became 
tsunami IDPs. This created a confusing situation for the donors, the implementers, and the 
beneficiaries. In some cases tsunami and war affected IDPs received assistance, in others 
they did not. Witnessing  such a situation where their neighbors were getting support in terms 
of shelter, livelihoods, psycho-social assistance, etc. without giving due regard to their plight 
was considered blatant discrimination toward the IDPs of war. This has resulted in tension, 
jealousy, and frustration which creates a potential for inter and intra-group conflicts. In 
addition to the direct consequences of such disparity, the cleavages and grievances that 
discrimination causes can be easily manipulated by parties to the conflict for mobilization. In 
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the case of Aceh, an ancillary problem involved locating and identifying the IDPs of war as a 
result of government restrictions and the fear of IDPs to be exposed by registering as IDPs. 
 
• In terms of conflict awareness, in Sri Lanka there were two categories.  The first one includes 
organizations that have operated in the country for a long time and hence have adequate 
knowledge concerning the nature of the conflict. This group performed better in terms of 
conflict sensitivity in the design and implementation of disaster assistance. The second 
group, which rushed into Sri Lanka following the tsunami with very little knowledge 
regarding the conflict, ended up having conflict-blind programs which, in some cases, 
created complications and tensions between the different communities. In Aceh, those few 
agencies that were present prior to the disaster were aware of the conflict dynamics and were 
consequently able to support the peace process directly and indirectly and hence 
fundamentally assist its potentially positive conclusion. However, the majority of the 
organizations currently in Aceh rushed in primarily for disaster relief and lacked adequate 
knowledge regarding the dynamics of the conflict. In some cases, interviewees and reports 
suggest that some international workers were not even aware that there was a conflict in 
Aceh prior to their arrival. As a result the level of conflict-sensitivity has proven to be 
inadequate in the delivery of aid. Although many of these organizations have been proactive 
in raising their awareness, the implementation of conflict-sensitive aid is still lacking. 
Fortunately, this drawback has not had a major affect on the peace process. However, as the 
euphoric honeymoon of the signing of the MOU fades and the realities of a very slow and 
disjointed reconstruction process emerge, the lack of conflict-sensitivity could easily create 
social problems and exacerbate pre-existing issues within the communities and between the 
Acehnese, Javanese, GAM, TNI, local governments, and the bureaucrats in Jakarta.  
 
• In principle, for success in such a huge disaster intervention, it is expected that smooth and 
cooperative relationships would be established between INGOS and CBOs, NGOs, and civil 
society. However, in the case of Aceh, this was not the case for two reasons. Firstly the local 
entities were just emerging and did not typically have adequate capacity to serve, negotiate, 
and work with the large international organizations. Secondly as in most cases, international 
organizations did not show the will to develop and/or use the capacity of these organizations 
and instead, at times, acted arrogantly by disregarding the potential strength of the 
indigenous organizations in terms of local knowledge and better access to the beneficiaries. 
In the case of Sri Lanka, many local NGOs were affected by the powerful and overwhelming 
presence of international organizations in terms of competition for beneficiaries and staff-
poaching which undermined their credibility among the communities. In many cases, the 
manner in which international organizations disempowered local NGOs will likely exert 
long-term negative impact because the latter would remain with the societies while the 




As discussed in the section dealing with concepts, ethnic and identity-based conflicts are more 
difficult to prevent, manage, and resolve particularly after violence erupts. The Sri Lankan 
conflict should be seen in this context because the conflict between the minority Tamils and the 
majority Sinhalese has predominantly been manifested in violent engagement between the LTTE 
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and the GOSL. To complicate things further, Muslim-Tamil tensions have emerged and tensions 
have risen in the northern and eastern parts of the country. Therefore any conflict resolution 
process should take into account and address the degree of ethnic polarization and the intensity 
of the conflicts between and among these communities. The LTTE has been effectively 
controlling a large portion of Sri Lanka as a de facto government with its own army, police, and 
judiciary units. Nevertheless, the LTTE was nervous following the break up of its eastern 
command led by Karuna, a situation that could be exploited by the government. Since Karuna’s 
rebellion, the Vanni LTTE has accused the GOSL of supporting his forces – thereby prosecuting 
a proxy war of sorts against them. Thus, although the fragile Cease-Fire Agreement had been in 
place since 2002, all indications prior to the tsunami suggested that the LTTE was preparing to 
return to war. 
 
The last time the two conflicting parties distanced themselves from the peace process was in 
2003 after the LTTE presented a proposal on an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) as a 
discussion point while the government put a condition to discuss that proposal only as part of 
negotiations on a final/permanent solution.  
 
The conflict in Aceh is characterized as a vertical conflict between GAM and the GoI. Most 
analysts remark that the conflict was based on the claim that, in the pre-independence era, Aceh 
was a separate entity with a distinct culture, language, and interpretation/practice of Islam. When 
the state of Indonesia was formed the people of Aceh were not consulted properly and were 
excluded and neglected by the new government. The Acehnese became frustrated because they 
had fought off colonization for centuries and had, in fact, even fought for Indonesian 
independence. Then, once Indonesia gained its independence, as many Acehnese would say, they 
were colonized by Indonesia. These grievances were further compounded by the exploitation of 
natural resources by the subsequent governments and the centralization of power by Jakarta 
which further threatened Aceh’s autonomy.  
 
From May 2003 until the tsunami, Aceh was under military control and few outside parties were 
allowed to enter. The two years of marshal law/civil emergency impacted on all of the parties 
including the GoI. During this period not only was GAM physically weakened by the TNI but it 
was also significantly alienated from the people of Aceh, who had been their ideological and 
economic support bases. The GoI and TNI were also war-fatigued and realized that they would 
not be able to completely destroy GAM militarily. In addition, besides the economic loss caused 
by the war in Aceh, the GoI was involved with several other intra-state conflicts. Realizing that 
military force would not resolve the conflict, prior to the tsunami the GoI was engaged in quiet 
talks with the exiled GAM leadership.  
 
With this background, one can examine how the tsunami and the subsequent interventions 
impacted the conflicting parties with the objective of understanding the context of the conflicts in 
Sri Lanka and Aceh and identifying possible factors for changes in the attitudes and positions of 
the actors involved.  
 
In Sri Lanka, the physical damage caused by the tsunami to both parties’ military strength was 
fairly insignificant. However, the level of destruction and the major task of tsunami recovery 
were considered as factors averting another imminent cycle of war. Beyond that, the tsunami and 
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its interventions did not create a situation that would either convince or oblige the two parties to 
go back to the negotiation table. The failure of P-TOMS (a joint mechanism) was anecdotal 
proof that the positions of the parties were as polarized, if not more so, than before the tsunami. 
Almost immediately after the tsunami, both sides wanted control over the use of international 
funds and thus mobilized grievances on issues of unequal distribution and discriminatory access 
to and participation of certain groups. As a result, the aid process became politicized and 
manipulated by political and/or ethnic entrepreneurs and thereby served as a divisive factor 
between and among communities. Therefore, whatever humanitarian will and associated sense of 
cooperation that prevailed was short-lived. Both parties quickly resorted to the rational 
calculation of their positions and the potential impact of any move toward or away from a peace 
process. In short, the impact of humanitarian assistance was limited to strictly relief-focused 
cooperation at local levels and was not exploited to contribute towards minimizing the gaps 
between the parties, let alone, to resolving the conflict.  
 
In Aceh, the destruction caused by both the tsunami and earthquake had an enormous impact 
both physically and psychologically on GAM, TNI, the GoI, and the people of Aceh. There are 
no exact figures on the actual death toll of government forces and GAM fighters but it was 
reported that both sides suffered significant losses. It is estimated that over 150,000 people were 
killed and 500,000 people were displaced by the tsunami. As a result of these losses both to their 
forces and the civilian population each side demonstrated a sense of humanitarian obligation to 
stop fighting in order to get involved in the relief operations. The GoI, due to economic 
difficulties, did not have the capacity to rehabilitate Aceh without the support of the international 
community. Prior to the tsunami, as witnessed by their engagement in a series of quiet talks, both 
sides had realized that the military option would not resolve their conflict. Therefore, both sought 
an opportunity to find a political solution, but lacked an exit strategy. The tsunami provided the 
space necessary for the international community to harness the opportunity by formalizing the 
negotiation process. At the track-one level, several international actors provided sticks and 
carrots to support and maintain the five successful rounds of talks culminating in the MoU of 15 
August 2005. Also the presence of the international community which significantly restrained 
the violent engagement of the two parties gave a sense of security to the people on the ground 
particularly in the tsunami affected areas.  
 
According to Zartman, parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so. This 
occurs when they run out of other alternatives, implying the impossibility of achieving decisive 
victory or the ability to continue engagement in protracted conflict. Only when there is a ripe 
moment do conflicts become amenable to resolution and such a moment is recognized or 
perceived by the parties in terms of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS). Other pertinent issues 
include the idea of commitment and grievance. In Zartman’s opinion the balance between the 
two determines the chance for the parties to the conflict, particularly the insurgents, to engage in 
settlement negotiations. For example, in situations where the level of commitment outweighs the 
importance of grievance, there is a possibility that the rebels will opt to continue fighting even if 
the level of grievance decreases.  
 
In Sri Lanka, although there has been a stalemate for quite a long time, there was no indication 
that either party perceived the stalemate to hurt them. To the contrary, as mentioned elsewhere in 
this paper, the parties, particularly the LTTE, was ready to return to fighting had it not been for 
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the tsunami. Given this situation, a ripe moment did not materialize when the tsunami hit and the 
disaster interventions did not significantly contribute to the emergence of one. Related to this, no 
MHS associated with an “impending past or recently avoided catastrophe” perceived by both 
conflicting parties in Sri Lanka existed. This was abundantly clear when the two parties failed to 
successfully implement even on very minimal humanitarian cooperation issues and mechanisms, 
for example (P-TOMS).  
 
According to Zartman, conflicts, when treated “early,” are more likely to engender the conditions 
for a MHS. In Aceh, the quiet, pre-tsunami talks between the GoI and the exiled GAM 
leadership could be considered as early treatment. Regarding MHS, one can mention that 
although TNI managed to significantly undermine the military capacity of GAM, the government 
was convinced that it was not going to permanently resolve the conflict through force. In the 
same token, GAM understood that it could not achieve its objective according to its current 
insurgency and the leadership realized that more severe damage to its military and political 
operations was imminent. Thus, the perception of a MHS and a Mutually Enticing Opportunity 
(MEO) created by the humanitarian spirit following the tsunami emerged thus nurturing a ripe 
moment. To complement this agreement, the presence of the international community has served 
as a guarantee significantly alleviating GAM’s sense of insecurity, an often critical barrier to the 
negotiated settlement of intra-state wars.  
 
Peace-building in a deeply divided society with armed conflict is profoundly challenging.  It 
therefore requires comprehensive approaches that address structural issues, social dynamics, and 
the necessary infrastructure for a resilient and sustained peace process. According to Lederach’s 
model, regarding the actors and approaches to peace building, there are three levels of 
leadership, top, middle and grassroots, which should be targeted using different approaches or 
intervention mechanisms. Lederach’s conclusion is that the middle level of leadership is critical 
because it has the qualities and capacities to influence both the grass-root and top level of 
leadership and hence serve as a source of practical, immediate action that can sustain long-term 
transformation. 
 
In Sri Lanka, all of the elements to Lederach’s pyramid were present. For example, at the track-
two or middle level several prominent academics in the field of conflict resolution interacted 
with religious, humanitarian, and ethnic (Tamils, Sinhalese and Muslims) leaders. At the 
grassroots level, a variety of NGOs and CBOs engaged in multiple peace-building activities. At 
the track-one level the Norwegians have been facilitating the peace process. However, in spite of 
the enormous presence of individuals and institutions at the middle level, ethnic and political 
divisions among these mid-level actors impinged on their ability to bridge gaps between 
conflicting parties. In addition, the mid-level actors were unable to support grassroots efforts 
significantly because they were by-and-large Colombo-centric. Substantial competition and 
friction between the different players existed at each level contributed to the ad hoc nature of 
most peace-building efforts and their disintegration without significant results at the macro and 
community levels. As per the recommendation of a group of renowned scholars, strategic 
alliances should be formed to engage all political actors as a critical mass of agents of change 
within Sri Lankan society. 
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As evidenced by the current peace process, the interaction in Aceh has been solely at the track-
one level creating the expression of mass concern regarding the exclusion of the mid-level and 
grassroots actors. This dilemma continues as the DDR is being implemented without significant 
popular participation. While substantial enthusiasm exists at the grassroots level and among the 
multitude of emerging NGOs and CBOs, the latter apparently lack the capacity and unity of 
purpose to have a significant impact on the peace-building and reconciliation in Aceh. Therefore, 
in order to ensure the sustainability of the peace-process, the greatest need as expressed by many 
interviewees and analytical reports is to build the capacity of local governance and civil society.      
 
Mari Fitzduff’s Meta-Conflict approach could have been applied in both conflicts using the 
opportunity created by the tsunami. According to this approach, Sri Lanka could have addressed 
subjective issues such as negative attitudes of different communities among each other, the 
broken and strained relationship between and among the various actors in the community, and 
the history of animosity, suspicion, and violence. On the objective or structural side, the tsunami 
was an opportunity to formulate the relief and reconstruction interventions while also addressing 
the conflict. Politically a chance emerged to form a national government uniting the two major 
southern parties and representatives of Tamils and Muslims. In line with this, constitutional 
issues on power-sharing and devolution of power or federalism could have been addressed. 
However, most of the approaches employed following the tsunami were ad-hoc and reactive. In 
addition, the opportunity to implement comprehensive, multi-sectoral interventions with long-
term vision was missed leaving the country as or more divided than before the tsunami. 
  
In Aceh, the conditions prior to the tsunami inhibited any type of psycho-social or structural 
interventions. The tsunami dramatically changed this dynamic providing a great opportunity to 
address both the psycho-social and structural dimensions of the conflict. Psychologically, the 
mere presence of international agencies in Aceh forced the government and GAM to change their 
attitude and behavior towards each other. The signing of the MOU, the successful process of 
DDR, and the beginnings of a self-governing Aceh provide significant evidence that the tsunami 
and the tsunami interventions were factors in some major structural changes. Several 
international agencies were fundamental for the successful implementation of the above 
processes. In addition, the creation of the BRR as a decentralized and participatory model that 
includes a serious focus on transparency and the eradication of corruption, reflects significant 
change. In regard to building trust and reducing animosity, the social fabric of Aceh has been 
torn, thus there is strong fear and distrust between GAM, TNI, and the communities affected by 
war. There have been some cases in which the tsunami interventions contributed to mending 
relations, however, if the current peace holds, the process of reconciliation will take years. 
Preliminary discussions are taking place related to possible challenges to the DDR process, i.e. 
the reintegration of GAM, as well as longer term reconciliation work, which includes justice, 
human rights, and the future role of the military and police in Aceh. The reconstruction process 
in Aceh has been very slow and the international community has rarely deviated from tsunami 
related work in order to engage in peace-building endeavors. However, as the reconstruction and 
peace process continue it appears that several organizations are interested in engaging more 







This section assesses the application of conflict sensitivity by different agencies in their disaster 
interventions in Sri Lanka and Indonesia/Aceh. For this purpose the eight principles identified by 
Barron et al. are used. 
 
Perceived equity in targeting: 
 
In Sri Lanka, many agencies failed to account for issues such as ethnic and religious cleavages 
and the issue of diversely affected populations such as IDPs of war, people living in abject 
poverty, and people affected by the tsunami. As a result, especially during the initial period, the 
eastern and northern provinces complained that the south was getting more assistance at their 
expense. Interviews and observations disclosed various grievances concerning the favoring of 
one ethnic community over another. For instance, Muslims and Tamils complained about the 
discriminatory approaches of some of the governmental and non-governmental agencies. Most 
importantly, there was a strong grievance expressed among the thousands of IDPs of war that the 
relief and reconstruction processes targeted only tsunami-affected people without giving due 
regard to their dire situation. 
 
In the case of Aceh, particularly in the beginning, agencies providing aid had to be extremely 
cautious of who and where they worked because of the very strict conditions given by the GoI. 
As a result of these restrictions, the areas suspected of supporting GAM did not receive the same 
attention from humanitarian aid agencies. In addition, there were no-go zones in areas where 
high levels of tension and violence between GAM and TNI remained. Most of these areas are 
scattered throughout the mountainous interior region. For these reasons, along with other issues 
including organizational mandates and security matters, the distribution of aid targeted only 
tsunami-affected people and those areas which were easily accessible. In addition, those areas 
along the coastal belt that are far from Banda Aceh and less accessible did not appear to be 
receiving equitable services. 
 
Community driven approaches: 
 
The objective of applying community driven approaches is to empower the communities and 
create a sense of ownership. This will also have a positive impact on the appropriateness of 
interventions and sustainability of the results.  
 
In Aceh, while there were some reports of international organizations applying community 
driven approaches, this aspect of the reconstruction process has been deficient. As a result, much 
of the aid delivered has been inappropriate. For example, the barracks (temporary houses) built 
for the affected people were designed in such ways that were insensitive to the people of Aceh. 
This resulted in not only enormous wastes of time and resources but also distrust and frustration 
among the local communities. There has also been lack of communication between international 
organizations and the affected communities. For example, in many instances unrealistic promises 
were made raising the expectations of the affected people. When the aid was not delivered as 
promised, explanations were not provided directly to the people. Interviews with the affected 
population suggested that they were confused about when, where, and why projects stop and 
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start. As a result, the affected population expressed higher comfort levels with the local NGOs 
because they had a greater understanding of the cultural nuances and encouraged the people to 
participate in the process. In fact, several of the local organizations have employed people 
affected by the tsunami, which provides greater empathy and understanding. The BRR has 
encouraged INGOs to employ and work with locals as it attempts to transform the typical top-
down paradigm to a flat, community-driven, participatory approach. 
 
In Sri Lanka, although a number of existing community organizations are capable of articulating 
the interests of the people, the GOSL, LTTE, and the INGOs did not try to involve these 
organizations of the local population in designing, implementing, and monitoring programs, for 
example, concerning shelter and livelihood, in a sufficient fashion. Thus, in most cases, 
communities and individuals were considered as passive recipients of aid. This disempowerment 
nurtured dependency, complacency, and the distribution of inappropriate qualities and quantities 
of aid. The beneficiaries have indicated that they did not know what, when, or how delivery of 
aid, including shelter, were assessed and implemented. In short, due to the lack of consultation 
with the local, affected and non-affected populations, an important missing link exists in the 
overall response strategy. In such situations, decisions were made with potentially important, 
long-term ramifications. These decisions were highly centralized and based on limited 
knowledge of the local conditions on the ground. The GOSL, LTTE, donors, and INGOs share 
responsibility for this.  
 
Focus on processes as well as outputs: 
 
In both Sri Lanka and Aceh, the humanitarian assistance was mostly donor-driven and result-
oriented, and therefore did not take into consideration popular views and preferences. I.e, How 
many houses can and should be constructed by the end of a stipulated time? But in any such 
situation there has to be a process involved in getting to the end product. The processes are 
important because they take into consideration the needs of more vulnerable groups including: 
children, women, and the disabled, and possibly affect intra-and/or inter-community 
relationships. The majority of the reconstruction efforts have been project-focused, lacking 
consultation with the affected populations.  
 
Build-in complaint mechanisms: 
 
This principle is meant to offer people the opportunity to voice their concerns and grievances on 
both the process and outcomes of the intervention mechanisms. When implemented well, it is 
helpful for both the beneficiaries and the agencies because it can improve efficiency and satisfy 
the needs of the people while protecting their interests. However, it is not enough to have such 
mechanisms unless the people know that they exist. Moreover, if grievances are addressed then 
their resolution and the end results of the resolution should be known to the people and the 
affected parties. 
 
In Sri Lanka, a gap has surfaced regarding complaint mechanisms and hence the UNDP 
supported a process to assess the people’s opinions concerning the relief and reconstruction 
interventions. This process started very late and it did not address the specific interventions 
implemented by each organization. In addition, the process appears to be intermittent rather than 
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long term and fluent. Observations and interviews disclosed that the beneficiaries did not know 
to whom to report their complaints and no mechanism was clearly advertised and utilized by 
INGOs to ascertain popular grievances. As a result a number of beneficiaries complained about 
the quality and appropriateness of the interventions. 
 
In Aceh, while complaint mechanisms have been implemented by individual INGOs there did 
not appear to be an advertised, accessible, and uniform way for beneficiaries to express their 
wishes or views. This has created a major problem because it affects the quality and pace of the 
reconstruction process. The affected people were confused as to whom they should go to for 
addressing insufficient and inappropriate services. Also, several INGOs expressed a need to 
develop better mechanisms for communicating with each other, particularly across sectors. For 
example, if a complaint regarding health concerns was stated to a representative from the 
housing sector, it might never reach the correct person responsible for the issue. Also, there did 
not appear to be links of communication between INGOs, IGOs, and local NGOs. For example, 
one village leader remarked that an INGO had promised houses for the village three months ago. 
When the representative of another INGO received this information, he was confused as to how 
to address this matter.  
 
Focus on ensuring transparency and accountability: 
 
Transparency and accountability are critical because they contribute to the prevention of 
corruption, misunderstanding, and false expectations. They also help to instill a sense of 
responsibility among the governments and agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance. 
 
In Sri Lanka, a lot of money came from private individuals and overseas donations. This, 
combined with the lack of an internationally agreed upon framework for implementation and the 
formation of an oversight body to monitor compliance, allowed the INGOs to carry out their 
operations without being screened by an expert body. In addition, the INGOs did not have to 
develop any kind of modus-operandi to work with the GOSL or parallel bodies. If the GOSL had 
a sufficient mechanism for overseeing and enforcing specified standards, technically, with 
enough capacity and will, greater regulations could have been placed on the massive number of 
INGOs in Sri Lanka. 
 
The lack of such a mechanism resulted in a situation where some of the agencies provided 
inappropriate and/or poor quality products. For example, in many instances the wrong kind/size 
of fishing nets, low quality, culturally insensitive housing, and duplicate resources were 
provided. Because of the blatant lack of a system for accountability there were no checks and 
balances on the humanitarian agencies’ implementation of aid. This, combined with 
unprecedented amounts of funding and limited time frames, has caused unnecessary problems 
between agencies and uncomfortable conditions for the affected people. 
 
During a visit to Salli village, an IDP camp, the researchers observed an encouraging beginning 
to a system of accountability and transparency. The donor and the implementation body had a 
board displaying the activities to be done in that camp with the budget for each of the line 
activities and the amount spent on each.  
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In Aceh, much of the information discussed above could be equally applied particularly in regard 
to the lack of screening of services delivered and the resulting inappropriate or inadequate 
services rendered. An additional issue has developed due to the slow process of reconstruction. 
Many members of the affected community indicated that they did not know enough about how 
the tsunami money was being spent.  This generated suspicion and distrust in the GoI as well as 
the international community. While the BRR was attempting to set up new guidelines for 
accounting to help crack down on corruption, there are not enough mechanisms to provide the 
beneficiaries with information regarding how much and where money is being spent. 
 
Many respondents also argue that the international community was more interested in sharing its 
information with their overseas donors than with their beneficiaries. That stated that several 
agencies were seeking ways to implement mechanisms that would help to improve systems of 
transparency and accountability to the beneficiaries. These mechanisms are very similar to the 
displays of activities and budgets discussed above in Sri Lanka. But, while these information 
boards have been helpful for the individual community, many suggested a need to improve this 
system by implementing a more macro level program perhaps through the media. 
 
Use of independent civil society: 
 
A strong and independent civil society is very important both to articulate and defend the 
interests of the affected people and to serve in the planning and implementation of disaster 
interventions by INGOs and the government. Local civil societies often have both technical 
know how, and the experience and knowledge on the context of the conflict.  Therefore, they can 
be instrumental in making humanitarian assistance conflict sensitive. Moreover, civil society’s 
decision making has a strong element of flexibility that the state sector often lacks. Both the 
NGOs and INGOs could exploit the elements of civil society to enhance the overall process of 
designing and implementing humanitarian interventions. 
 
In Sri Lanka, the civil society played a tremendous role in the first weeks of the disaster. 
However, due to factors including the political nature of some of the civil society, the neglect of 
both the government and the NGOs, and the fractured nature of the overall system of civil 
society in Sri Lanka, they were not optimally used in the disaster and reconstruction processes. 
There is an encouraging attempt by the Foundation for Coexistence, Sewa Lanka foundation, and 
the National Anti-War Front to develop a network of civil societies in order to increase their 
contribution in the post-tsunami interventions. 
 
In Aceh, the potential of the civil society has been under-utilized by the international actors in 
several major areas that were necessary for implementing conflict sensitive aid, particularly in 
regard to the nuances of the Acehnese culture and the conflict dynamics between GAM, TNI, the 
GoI, and the people of Aceh. In addition to cultural and conflict sensitivity, Aceh’s civil society 
can provide local knowledge which is helpful for reaching places that are either unknown to or 
inaccessible to the majority of the international actors. Unfortunately, many international 
agencies explained that the lack of capacity and potential association with GAM has deterred 
them from working closely with many local NGOs and CBOs. Despite the suffering of civil 
society caused by marshal law, there are indeed many very capable and qualified local NGOs 
and CBOs. Since the tsunami, numerous civil groups have emerged; however, they do not appear 
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to be connected. Thus, one of the difficulties for the international community was determining 
which organizations were legitimate, capable, and non-political. One of the other major issues 
was the poaching of qualified staff and the subordination of local NGOs by INGOs because they 
were not given full ownership of the process. Instead the local NGOs were simply used to 
implement the programs created by INGOs.  
 
In addition to local NGOs many highly capable and active individuals and groups in Aceh are 
involved in human right advocacy, peace/conflict resolution research, and women’s rights issues. 
Although some international organizations are utilizing these resources, they are not being fully 
capitalized on. Their involvement is essential for the success of the reconstruction and peace 
processes. 
 
Including the government at different levels in planning and implementation: 
 
In most, if not all cases disaster intervention agencies would eventually like the local and 
provincial governments to be responsible for the relief and reconstruction operations in the 
respective country. It would be advisable, thus, to involve the government through its agencies at 
various levels in the planning and implementation processes of disaster interventions. This would 
help the government to make sure that, among others issues, environmental protection, inter-
community harmony, and people-to-government relationships were not negatively affected by 
projects. However, if central, provincial and local government agencies are involved in disaster 
relief and reconstruction processes, it is important that their work is in accordance with, among 
others, international human rights laws, Sphere Standards, and the Principles of Internally 
Displaced People. In Sri Lanka, the government’s role was limited by-and-large to providing 
information such as lists of beneficiaries, the allocation of land, and to rather ineffective 
coordination efforts. In terms of the “Buffer Zone” and other major decisions, the central 
government was fully involved in policy development and procedures for managing recovery. In 
such cases the centralization was problematic. While there have been some encouraging attempts 
at district levels where NGOs, INGOs, and the government agencies have tried to work together, 
more cross consultation and cooperation between government agencies and INGOs would be 
beneficial to relief and reconstruction processes. 
 
In Aceh, due to the conditions prior to the tsunami and the heavy-handed nature of the 
government, there were many restrictions placed on international agencies. While the signing of 
the MoU and the presence of the EU-ASIAN, AMM has provided a lot of space for the 
international community, the GoI continues to act in an authoritative fashion. At times this has 
created an awkward dynamic, particularly because many of the international organizations 
entered Aceh with the perception that it was a failed state and thus acted accordingly. In reality, 
although highly corrupt, the GoI remains a functional bureaucracy that must be informed of any 
international presence and the work that international bodies are undertaking. Almost all 
organizations were restricted to the tsunami reconstruction effort. However, several 
organizations that developed a positive rapport with the GoI have been able to engage in the 
conflict situation in various ways including DDR.  
 
Working directly with the government engenders pros as well as cons. The bureaucratic level is 
notoriously high, contributing to very slow processes and extreme frustration. The benefit is the 
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sustainability of both the organizations’ presence in Indonesia/Aceh and the projects themselves. 
It is most likely that the majority of the agencies working in Aceh will have to leave within the 
relatively near future and thus any project in which the government is not invested may likely be 
discontinued. By including the GoI in the process, one can achieve buy-in while also building 
rapport. In addition, many reports and interviews suggest the need to improve both the 
institutional capacity of the GoI as well as the people’s trust in its capacity. By avoiding working 
with the GoI, this opportunity to develop its institutional capacity as well as its relationship with 
the people is lost.  
 
Providing support to the field staff: 
 
The field staff play a crucial role in humanitarian intervention because they work directly with 
the beneficiaries and hence their input is critical in identifying needs, complaints, and concerns 
of the affected people and the stakeholders involved as well as in effective and appropriate 
implementation of the interventions. Thus, the field staff should get adequate and continuous 
support in terms of building their capacity to provide contextual/conflict sensitive aid. In this 
regard, in Sri Lanka, there have been attempts to develop resource materials in conflict- 
sensitivity and in organizing workshops and training for the INGO staff at different levels. 
However, there are visible gaps in actual practice. 
 
In Aceh, the terrain for field staff was neither glamorous nor easy to navigate. On top of thirty 
years of war, the level of destruction created by the tsunami is enormous. Field staff working in 
Aceh must be aware of security issues related to GAM and TNI, while at the same time 
remaining on good terms with the government bodies. In addition, with the current developments 
in the peace process, the conditions for working in Aceh are continuously changing. This context 
makes supporting field staff an imperative. Many local members of civil society, NGOs, and 
CBOs said that many of the staff came to Aceh with very little knowledge of the context or 
culture of Aceh. In many instances, this included the leaders of the organizations. Therefore, the 
learning curve has been steep for most of the international agencies. Several of the major 
organizations explained that they were providing training, support, and protection for their staff 
to the best of their ability, but they also suggested that the best training and protection one could 
have was the acquisition of local knowledge and the experience of working in conflict 
environments.  
 
To summarize there is a growing awareness of the need to become conflict-sensitive in the 
planning, design, and implementation of humanitarian intervention. For instance, in Sri Lanka, 
the donor community developed a set of Guiding Principles for relief and recovery. The 
objective of these principles was to highlight the need to take into account issues of equality, the 
prevention of corruption, peace-building, environmental concerns, and the participation of the 
people in the planning and implementation of the reconstruction processes. However, in regard 
to practical applications, the monitoring of and actions taken toward the correction and 
mitigation of the problems created because of the existing and created gaps has been minimal. As 
a result, the issue of conflict sensitivity and the idea of Do No Harm were more rhetoric than 





Sri Lanka and Indonesia/Aceh provided the researchers testing grounds for applying several 
theories and principles of conflict resolution and development/humanitarian assistance. The 
intricacies and challenges of providing humanitarian assistance in conflict situations should be 
quite evident from the preceeding summary and analysis. One of the major conclusions that 
emerged from the research was that the magnitude of assistance did not necessarily lead to 
sustainable and effective solutions. Therefore, as much as, if not more than the level of 
assistance, the manner of delivery and the context in which it has been designed and 
implemented should be recognized as having dramatic impact on disaster relief, development, 
and conflict resolution. Having said this, the researchers make the following recommendations to 
help guide current and future humanitarian work in conflict situations and to provide direction 
for future research. 
 
Disaster Management Plans: 
 
All indications in the two countries underscore the mandatory need for proper early warning and 
disaster preparedness systems to successfully deal with huge natural calamities. It has been 
commented that countries with disaster preparedness systems with effective structures reacted 




      The funds raised by private sources in response to the tsunami were greater than those allocated 
by the government. These funds raised by INGOs were ear-marked for the tsunami-affected 
population. Future fund-raising and resource allocation efforts should be creative and flexible so 
that such inter-related problems could be handled in a holistic and comprehensive way. This 
should at most avoid and at least reduce the tensions and possible conflicts among these 
communities. In addition, such funds should also be available for overall development plans for 
communities in the affected areas in order to ensure a sustainable impact both at a community 
and possibly at the macro level. 
 
Conditional Debt Relief: 
 
To force governments in disaster and conflict-affected countries to use resources both for 
development and peace efforts, the international community should put conditions on recipients 
to create plausible development and conflict-mitigation projects before they waive or reduce 
bilateral and multi lateral debts. These will complement relief, reconstruction, and peace 
processes, and prevent the diversion of funds into military activities.  
 
      Adapting to Domestic Contexts: 
 
Based on the drawbacks observed in the course of this research, it is recommended that 
international actors should be aware of the need to adapt concepts in conflict resolution and 
development works to local culture, language, and psychological make–up of the society in 
which they intend to work.  In addition, they should not attempt to transplant concepts, 
approaches, and programs that were used in other disaster situations with different contexts. For 
instance, an approach or mechanism used by a UN agency in Afghanistan or Somalia should not 
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be replicated in Sri Lanka or Aceh without due consideration and adaptation. This requires 
attention by the international community in conjunction with the widely recommended 
requirement of understanding the context of a particular country.  
        
      Impact on Local Values: 
 
It should be taken into account that short-term objectives of facilitating or expediting relief or 
reconstruction projects can have negative impacts on the values and discipline of the affected 
community. For instance, it has been observed that less meticulously planned ”cash for work” 
programs have affected the work ethic of communities and eroded their local coping 
mechanisms. Such approaches also affect the practice and convictions of people in working for 
the community cause and hence they often begin to calculate their participation in terms of 
material benefits instead of the humanitarian ethics of helping one’s neighbor. 
    
Cross–Learning: 
 
      For effective coexistence and conflict resolution, development work should be viewed as an 
integral component of any intervention. Therefore, in as much as development interventions are 
advised to be conflict-sensitive, the conflict resolution analyst/practitioner should also be 
conversant with concepts and practices of development. This reflects the need for a substantial 
increase in cross-learning and cooperation between researchers, practitioners, and agencies in the 
two fields.  
       
      Contingency Plans: 
 
The final recommendation deals with the need for contingency plans in peace efforts/processes. 
In post-tsunami Sri Lanka, a lot of attention and discussion was focused only on the 
establishment of a joint mechanism between the GOSL and LTTE. When that process failed, 
frustration and disillusionment followed, and because there was no theoretical or operational 
contingency plan, a vacuum was formed. As a result, immediately following the failure of P-
TOMS, the hope and anticipation of peace turned into the fear and suspicion of the return to war. 
The international community and others concerned with peace in Sri Lanka should have 
simultaneously invested in community level conflict-mitigation and peace-building work to 
minimize the dangers of failures at the track-one level. On the other hand, there has been a 
degree of euphoria in Aceh due to the success of the track-one level peace agreement between 
the GoI and GAM. However, even though it does not appear to be the case, the leadership of 
both parties as well as many members of Acehnese and Javenese civil society suggested that the 
failure of this peace process, the third attempt at a negotiated settlement, would result in a long 
period of protracted war. Despite this concern, if the MoU faces some serious challenge, there 
does not appear to be any contingency plans to prevent the fragile peace process from total 
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